Adapting what Kant once said regarding the Enlightenment, we can ask, do we live in a cosmopolitan time or condition? Definitely, we do not. Cosmopolitanism is an ideal rather than reality. However, we can have many experiences that anticipate or indicate aspects of what this cosmopolitan condition might be. We may also experience what cosmopolitanism is not. How would we know? In order to even identify what we are talking about, we need a cosmopolitan ideal. In the previous chapters, I argued that the concept of a multidimensional discourse community can help us in this regard if we account for its intricate aspects and relate them to questions concerning community, human rights, and universal norms. Possessed with these tools we are in a condition to identify and evaluate individual behavior, actions by nation-states, supranational projects such as the European Union, and point out what counts as a possible anticipation of a critical cosmopolitan ideal.

**Expanding the Critical Project: A Multidimensional Discourse Community**

The first chapter presented a specific *tradition of critique* in the German context, which goes from Immanuel Kant through Theodor Adorno to Jürgen Habermas and continues today in the work of a new generation of scholars who constitute a truly global school of thought. This tradition is in continuous transformation—and this also applies to Habermas and Apel, who have changed their views on several issues. I not only took this tradition of critique as my point of departure, but I also placed it in relation with other traditions while observing its internal transformations. In view of the transformations within the critical tradition and the shortcomings in previous approaches,
Discourse Philosophy seems to me the best articulated and most robust revision of critical theories available because it has expanded the traditional framework of critique to translate and update a series of important themes in terms of discourses. While concentrating on the work of Habermas and Apel, I also showed some limits in their answers to new challenges brought up by multicultural societies, intercultural interactions, and global processes. Therefore, it is necessary to take into account the differences between Habermas and Apel and consider both Apel’s Transcendental Pragmatics and Discourse Ethics as well as Habermas’s Universal Pragmatics and Discourse Theory of Law, Politics, and Morality in order to use their respective tools to address specific problems. My conclusion was that we make use of their different approaches by accounting for differences in the process of justification and application of norms. Therefore, it is possible and necessary to articulate all the tools available in a larger project I defined as Critical Discourse Philosophy.

The most important point taken from Discourse Philosophy is the emphasis on a community of communication, which is used and expanded in different ways by Apel and Habermas. While Apel takes this concept from Charles S. Peirce and applies it in a more theoretical way, he also connects it with ethics, morality, and other practical issues, proposing a dialectics between the real and the ideal communities of communication. Habermas, in turn, has the same concept as point of departure, but then expands and changes its usage by specifying the ways in which we communicate in particular settings. Thus, he offers a typology of discourses that can be applied horizontally to different kinds of questions; he also identifies communicative practices and redefines the roles of the Discourse Principle (D) and the Universalization Principle (U) without necessarily giving up the normative dimension implicit in them. He does adopt, however, a weaker reading of such principles, which brings new challenges to his position. In any case, his theory allows us to account for a political community, a legal community, or a moral community, which are to be understood as plural communities of communication—that is, as the application of communicative rationality and discourse procedures in different institutional settings. In each case, Habermas insists on the need to articulate and avoid reductions between the individual and a community, while Apel emphasizes the difference between the factual community in which we operate and the normative and ideal community we anticipate counterfactually as we engage in communication and reflect on the very meaning of our communicative actions. A tension between morality and legality has remained throughout our discussion as an