The literature commenting on Kripke’s book is vast. But the reading of the sceptical paradox and of Kripkenstein’s solution introduced above warrants neglecting many contributions to the debates. I shall, in the remainder of Part I, address three further questions:

1. To what extent is my alternative sceptical solution a Wittgensteinian proposal?
2. How do orthodox Wittgensteinians understand the sceptical paradox and can they explain grasping as extrapolating?
3. Are there responses to the sceptical challenge which explain language use (at least in part) through factual correctness and what are the prospects of such responses?

Below, I shall first discuss the contributions by Gordon Baker and Peter Hacker. This responds to questions 1 and 2. It will emerge that, concerning question 1, my alternative take on a sceptical solution is a heterodox Wittgensteinian proposal. And I shall argue that, concerning question 2, all Wittgensteinians must yet find a way to fully explain grasping as extrapolating.

As an answer to question 3, I shall introduce the proposal by Paul Boghossian, who argues that correct language use can be explained in terms of correctness-conditions which anchor meaning in a factual basis that is (at least in principle) independent of human thought and talk.

At the end of Part I, when the three questions will have been addressed, we will have established the topics for the other parts: in Part II, the issues between my heterodox Wittgensteinian proposal and Boghossian’s proposal are to be settled; in Part III, an account of linguistic competence is to be given which explains grasping as extrapolating.
2.1 Wittgensteinian views

Was Wittgenstein an exclusionist?

Kripkenstein’s sceptical solution is an exclusionist proposal: language users are justified in saying what they say if nobody objects and such justifications do not require metaphysical foundations. Every member of a community is in principle allowed to falsify claims about language use, rule following and concept-possession in general once appropriate defeasibility-criteria are met. So, the sceptical solution employs a form of falsificationism about such claims. It is an interesting question whether Wittgenstein himself puts the concept of falsification to a similar use and contrasts it with verification just like Kripkenstein does.

At a first glance, there is not much in Wittgenstein which suggests that he thinks that falsification (at least sometimes) enjoys priority over verification. Running searches in the electronic edition of the *Bergen Nachlass* for ‘falsification’, its cognates and the German ‘Falsifikation’ (plus cognates) yields only few results. Most of them appear in discussions about probability and prediction (e.g. TSS 215A:6, 215b:16, 209:132, 211:640, 211:660), expectations (TS 209:4, MS 108:59) or – most important for present purposes – extrapolations into infinity (MS 133:77–8, TSS 211:660, 211:637–8, 215a:4–5, 215b:16). It is most significant that Wittgenstein only distinguishes falsification from verification when he discusses extrapolations of some sort. In all other examples, no such distinction is made.

The distinction is made, however, when it comes to extrapolations because, as Wittgenstein argues in these passages, it is possible to falsify statements about extrapolations into infinity whereas it is impossible to verify them. He mentions three examples in particular. The first is the statement that there is no end to the integers succeeding 1 in the series of natural numbers (TSS 215b:16, 211:660). The second is the statement that there is an infinitely long row of trees (MS 133:77–8, TSS 211:637–8, 215a:4–5) and the third (obtained from the same passages) is the law of inertia, which says that an object continues a movement in a straight line infinitely if friction and other interferences are absent. All three statements are found falsifiable but not verifiable. It is therefore exegetically warranted to infer that the semantic correctness of the extrapolations in these examples is, according to Wittgenstein, to be characterised in exclusionist terms. The passages do, however, not support Kripkenstein’s claim that all understanding must be explained in exclusionist terms.