Chapter Highlights

- Some important concepts from phenomenology: intentionality, adumbration, moments of perception...
- ...and their Leibnizian counterparts: appetition, expression, and so on
- Moments of perception and aspects of perception
- Simple reflection and immediate memory in Leibniz: ‘throwing back’ present perceptual content
- Appetites as ‘differential predispositions’ about the immediate future

Having introduced empirical findings about hearing and especially about the close relation between hearing and time, the announced phenomenological re-consideration of their philosophical importance is now due.

As already mentioned in Section 1.1, the present investigation is meant to give audition or hearing its proper place within philosophical discourse and to act as a counterbalance to the hegemony of vision. Indeed, also within Husserlian phenomenology a bias toward vision is evident: the Greek verb phainomai itself means ‘to visually appear’, and many of Husserl’s technical terms – such as ‘horizon’, ‘halo’, ‘adumbration’, ‘seeing essences’ – have strong visual connotations.

Husserl himself was in fact aware of this terminological bias and also of his excessive or even overstressed use of the term ‘phenomenon’ (Hua XXV: 699–72). And when it comes to the explication of his account of time consciousness, there is a general shift in Husserl’s own examples from the visual to the auditory domain. Thus, the present emphasis on audition may enforce this and allow for new perspectives on some traditional phenomenological concepts (see Schmicking 2003: 82). On the
other hand, the following discussion also tries to avoid the opposite mistake of turning phenomenology into a strict ‘akouomenology’ in which all visual metaphors are replaced by auditory ones. The present emphasis on auditory perception is surely not meant to deny that actual states of perception usually involve more than one modality – that they are often complex bundles of auditory, visual, olfactory, and other aspects.¹

So let me now introduce those concepts from Husserlian phenomenology which are important with respect to hearing and which will be helpful to further explicate and structure the empirical findings reported in the previous chapter. Introducing them will also provide me with some tools for a further explication of a Leibnizian account of perception, and, in particular, it will head me toward a more fine-grained analysis of time consciousness.

### 7.1 Intentionality, adumbrations, moments, and intuition

Remember that according to Leibniz the main difference between the internal structure of the perceptual realm and the physical realm lies in the fact that one is governed by final causation, the other by efficient causation. Notably, a similar distinction is also used by Husserl to separate the realm of phenomenological research from that of the natural sciences. Instead of ‘final causation’, the term used by Husserl to denote the structural relations in the phenomenological or perceptual realm is ‘motivation’ (whereas the efficient causal relations governing the physical realm are usually referred to by him as ‘causation’):

> the synthesis of consciousness is completely different from the external combinations of natural elements...; instead of spatial mutual externality, spatial intermingling and interpenetration, and spatial totality, it pertains to the essence of conscious life to contain an intentional intertwining, motivation, mutual implication by meaning, and this in a way which in its form and principle has no analog at all in the physical. (Hua IX: 366–7/S: 26)

Thus, Husserl takes motivation to be a pervasive aspect of the whole phenomenal realm and to denote its ‘fundamental lawfulness’, without any direct or immediate reference to the physical or to efficient causation (Hua IV: 220–47; see also Rang 1973: 44–6, 112–38). Also, the choice of the term ‘motivation’ itself is meant to emphasize a general