In this chapter we first summarize our findings from the case studies and make comparisons across cases, answering our second and third research questions on the patterns and strategies of opposition. Second, we discuss the democratic dimensions of opposition in global governance, arguing that this is well captured both through notions of ‘counter-democracy’ (Rosanvallon 2008) and ‘monitory democracy’ (Keane 2009) and – especially in the field of development – a focus on global justice as a prerequisite for a more substantial form of global democracy. Finally, we return to our first research question on the re-conceptualization of CSO–GGI relations in terms of ‘opposition’ and discuss some further implications of this for research on civil society activism in a global governance context. We also suggest directions for future research in this field.

**Opposing the global governance of development:**
**the EU, ADB and GFMD compared**

In this book we have analysed civil society activism targeting the global governance of development, as played out in relation to three regional and global governance institutions: the EU, ADB and GFMD. Our conceptualization has been that of ‘opposition’. Drawing on classical comparative politics literature on opposition politics in Western democracies, as well as the (within this field) more common theories of social movements and transnational activism, we have described the patterns of civil society opposition surrounding the GGIs in terms of ‘oppositional fields’ and explained the choice of opposition strategies (inside and outside) with reference to the political opportunity structure of the GGI as well as organizational identities and goals of opposition.
actors. The empirical analysis has been presented in the form of three case studies. Now it is time to make more systematic comparisons across our three cases.

When we selected the cases we had some assumptions about how they would differ based on variation in degree of legalization and access. We expected to find more opposition in general (featuring both inside and outside strategies) towards highly legalized GGIs. To some extent our case studies contradicted this assumption. The GFMD has a very low degree of legalization, but nevertheless attracts a considerable amount of opposition. The EU has a high degree of legalization, but its governance of development cooperation does not provoke much protest (though there is considerable inside opposition in this case). We also assumed that a high level of access will support the inside strategy. This assumption is confirmed by our three case studies as the case with most access (EU) featured mainly inside opposition whereas the case with least access (GFMD) had much more of the outside strategy. The ADB was placed in between both in terms of access and the balance of inside and outside strategies.

We analysed the pattern of civil society opposition targeting the selected GGIs in terms of oppositional fields. The oppositional fields were mapped according to their degree of concentration, their distinctiveness in relation to the GGI and the goals of the actors making up the field. The three cases feature interesting differences in this respect (see Table 7.1).

We consider the oppositional field surrounding both the EU’s policies and practices concerning development cooperation and the ADB as having a high degree of concentration. Both fields are characterized by the presence of a large number of CSOs, which would imply a low concentration, but the fact that the activities of most CSOs are coordinated through meta-organizations makes the oppositional fields concentrated. In the case of the EU there are several meta-organizations, but the position of CONCORD as the key organization with privileged access to EU institutions stands out. In the case of the ADB much oppositional activism targeting the Bank is coordinated by the NGO Forum on ADB. The oppositional field surrounding the GFMD differs from the other two cases in this respect as the degree of concentration is low. While there are important networking and coordinating activities going on within the different civil society processes making up the oppositional field surrounding the GFMD, there is no single meta-organization.

Concerning distinctiveness, it is the oppositional field in the EU case that stands out in comparison with the other two cases. Distinctiveness