Conceptualizing transformations in academic fields is a complex task, as neither transformations nor academic fields can be analytically approached as homogeneous and static objects of inquiry. What can be observed as a disciplinary change in one case might already be an established disciplinary practice in another case; what might appear as a transformation prompted by digital technologies could actually be a long-existing inclination brought to light by new technical means; what could be (administratively) defined as a cohesive field of study might consist of diverse, even opposed, research practices and assumptions. Therefore, disciplinary transformations proposed in this chapter are not conceived as either exhaustive or fixed categories. Rather, they are proposed as indicators of possible scholarly (re)orientations within particular communities of practice. Based on the fieldwork data, I propose and trace four areas of scholarly (re)orientations, conceived as processes of capacity building. One area concerns research capacity, another focuses on knowledge capacity, the third considers technical capacity, while the fourth area of transformation discusses value capacity in the humanities.

**Research capacity**

As illustrated in chapter 2, digital technologies are permeating all phases of humanists’ workflow, but with different degrees of adoption and impact. These technologies are indispensable for
finding and accessing information, as well as in writing research outputs, but their use in analytical and interpretative practices is still not fully established among humanists. Thaller (2012) observes that 40 years ago the use of computers in humanists’ work had the same twofold role: easing routine tasks and pursuing methodological development (pp. 9–10). Decades later, digital methods have not yet achieved wider uptake in humanists’ analytical work, and this is where practices of scholars in the humanities and sciences still diverge most significantly. The reasons for that are manifold. Sometimes, the roots can be sought in a traditional tale of “two cultures” (Snow, 2001/1959), and the politics of evidence that continued in later years, promoting the debates of dualism between the empirical sciences and the humanities (see Denzin and Giardina, 2008). But reasons for this can also be sought closer to the digital humanities ground, in specific activities and epistemic commitments pursued in this field.

One element is related to massive digitization efforts that shaped digital humanities for several decades. Digitizing primary materials and preparing them for easy access and advanced analytical manipulation was a necessary and commendable endeavor of numerous projects and institutions, but the downside was that human and financial resources were often exhausted in those efforts. Instead of being a phase toward analytical goals, digitization frequently ended as a goal in itself. Thaller (2012) argues that preparation of digital material was so labor exhaustive, that many projects run out of time and energy for analysis, creating one of the biggest problems in the field. With the Web capabilities developed throughout the 1990s, the activities in digital humanities shifted toward demonstratively successful digitizing efforts, and, again, away from analysis:

While the interest in analytical possibilities [of digital humanities] was moderate, the interest in the proven possibility of having tens of thousands of pages of archival documents instantly available in the early WWW was overwhelming. (Ibid., p. 10)

This legacy of digitization as the end, not the entry point, has had effects for many years, shaping humanists’ perception and