This chapter shows that a direct route between transcendental logic and general and pure logic is impossible. An indirect route is possible, however, but it requires us to take a detour through Immanuel Kant’s sometimes confusing general estimation of the epistemological situation of the human standpoint. I argue in conclusion that the two logics are isomorphic. By this I mean that they are heterogeneous from one perspective, but homogeneous from another.

We concluded Chapter 3 by suggesting that the doctrine of quantity in the Critique requires that all determinate cognition that is in accordance with the valid use of the categories must have, involved in its object, extensive magnitude. Within the limit conditions of the valid use of the categories, anything that can be an object of perception and knowledge must be first an aggregate – the result of the synthesis of homogeneous parts. Does this result help us understand the way in which a transcendental account of quantity can provide a foundation for logic’s treatment of quantity? How does the logical treatment of the relation of spheres in judgment relate to that of the transcendental account of the possibility of all objects of perception and determinate science? In other words, how can we move from a transcendental account of quantity back to make sense of quantity as taken up in formal logic? The following sections construct an interpretation of the way in which general and pure logic can be said to be related to, but not grounded by, transcendental logic.

(1) A direct or circuitous route?

I would like to present what I think are three clues that help us to map out the routes available to us for constructing an interpretation of the
way in which quantity in general and pure logic is related to quantity in
the transcendental logic.

The first clue I would like to present supports the idea of a discernable
route between the two logics. This first clue is the metaphysical deduc-
tion itself. Our analyses of the metaphysical deduction in Chapters 1, 2,
and 3 made it clear that Kant takes traditional formal logic as a clue for
genesis of the table of categories, an element in the transcendental logic.
The fact that this deduction is even undertaken by Kant gives credence
to the idea that there must be some path between the two logics. The
second clue is taken from our analyses in Chapter 2. There we noticed
the way in which the discourse of the transcendental logic *encroaches*
upon the discourse of the general and pure logic. These encroach-
ments take place where Kant is trying to break with the tradition of
logic. We saw this especially with regard to Kant’s justifications for the
inclusion of the singular judgment as a distinct moment of quantity
in judgment, and with regard to his discussions of the nature of the
copula. What is important about these encroachments of the discourse
of transcendental logic into the general and pure logic is that they give
us a reason to suppose that in some way the discourse of transcendental
logic constitutes a philosophical treatment of general and pure logic.
This clue, taken together with the clue that the metaphysical deduction
represents, suggests that there is reason to believe a route between the
two logics exists. Yet, it remains to be determined what this route is.

The third clue I would like to present suggests decisively that there
is no *direct* route available between the two logics. If we are to inter-
pret Kant’s project in the first critique accurately, the radical discipli-
nary heterogeneity between the two logics must be maintained. This
cue concerns the distinct difference between transcendental logic and
general and pure logic, especially in regard to the way in which the tran-
scendental logic functions as a ground for other disciplines. This distinc-
tive difference was already emphasized in the third chapter, but I think
now we can try to situate the architectonic meaning of this difference in
a more satisfactory manner. Kant claims in the B edition preface that the
main task of the transcendental logic is to provide the foundations and
limit conditions for synthetic a priori judgments. Mathematics, natural
science, and metaphysics are the disciplines concerned with the content
of synthetic and a priori judgments. Pure and general logic, as we saw in
Chapters 1 and 3, is not concerned with synthetic a priori judgments in
their difference to analytic judgments. If we look at the results of Kant’s
critical inquiry we can say, without arousing too much controversy, that
synthetic a priori judgments whose objects are beyond the possibility